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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to analyse the tax burden in Croatia and to find 
out whether and how the size and the structure of total labour costs affect the functioning 
of the labour market. The tax wedge, together with employment and unemployment rates, 
is brought into play to classify EU countries and Croatia into clusters using K-means 
and hierarchical clustering. The results show that Croatia is classified among countries 
with a high tax wedge and a high unemployment rate. The same holds when, instead of 
the tax wedge, personal average tax rate is considered. However, in Croatia most of the 
tax burden is borne by the employees, not by the employers. Thus, the average Croatian 
industry worker bears a relatively high tax burden, which is exacerbated when the newly 
introduced “crisis tax” and increased VAT are taken into account. 
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1 Introduction
Nobody likes to pay taxes. Every taxpayer is pretty disgruntled when a part of their 
income is wrested away for the government. Therefore, the tax bite always hurts, but the 
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strength of the pain depends upon how deep the bite goes. In 2009, after constant incre-
ases and introductions of different form of taxes since the beginning of the nineties, all 
taxpayers in Croatia experienced an additional burden aimed at alleviating the consequ-
ences of the financial crisis. The attitude among the general population in Croatia is that 
they have among the highest tax burdens in Europe, if not in the whole world. Yet, some 
empirical research suggests a different viewpoint. Therefore, this paper tries to give an 
objective picture of the situation in the labour market and in taxes (and contributions) im-
posed on workers as compared with that in EU countries.
The main issue that this paper deals with is the effect that the presence of taxes and 
social security contributions has on the functioning of the labour market, especially in 
Croatia. The existence of these levies is primarily justified by the government expendi-
tures. Although only social security contributions are directly connected to the functio-
ning of the labour market, both taxes and contributions may have different effects on the 
behaviour of labour supply and labour demand. At a certain level of wages, a higher tax 
burden increases unemployment and causes incentives for firms to work in the informal 
sector of the economy. Whether and to what extent the introduction of taxes on labour 
affects the outcomes in the labour market primarily depends on the elasticity of demand 
and supply curves and the flexibility of labour market.
It has been shown how high taxes on salaries contribute, not only to higher unem-
ployment, but also to lower participation and employment in the labour market (Cazes 
and Nesporova, 2007). The size of the labour supply is probably the most important de-
terminant of labour force competitiveness in any given country (Grdović Gnip and Tomić, 
2009). Accordingly, by analysing the impact of taxes and contributions on the labour mar-
ket, one can determine how much the government can influence the size of its labour mar-
ket by increasing/decreasing taxes and/or social security contributions. 
This paper consists of five parts. Section 2, after the introduction, presents a theore-
tical background of correlations between labour taxes and situation in the labour market, 
i.e. labour supply and demand. Section 3 gives a framework for the empirical analysis 
of tax wedge effects giving an overview of the situation in the Croatian labour market in 
comparison with those in EU member states and a complete overview of tax wedges and 
personal average tax rates for different wage levels. Section 4 deals with the classifica-
tion of EU countries and Croatia into clusters using hierarchical and K-means clustering 
with the data for 2008. Besides the tax wedge and employment/unemployment rates, the 
section takes into account the personal average tax rate and the EPL index, but it also in-
troduces the consumption tax (VAT only) as another burden on the net average wage of 
every worker. In the case of Croatia, it considers the possible further development of the 
Croatian tax wedge in 2009, reflecting two crucial facts: (1) the newly introduced “crisis 
tax” levied on net wages, and (2) the increase of consumption tax in form of VAT. Secti-
on 5 gives concluding remarks and possible policy recommendations too.
2 Theoretical background
Payroll taxes, income taxes and social contributions together, drive a wedge between 
the cost of labour to the firm and the net wage of the worker and therefore may have dis-
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tortional effects on the functioning of the labour market. These distortional effects of the 
tax wedge are primarily observed through the lower supply of labour by workers, but also 
through less job creation by firms than would be the case without taxes and contributions. 
The tax wedge actually appears between total labour costs, which consist of gross wage, 
social security contributions, payroll tax and fringe benefits, and the net wage received by 
employees. Between all the categories of total labour costs, there are two relevant bases 
according to which different levels of tax burden can be considered (Figure 1). 





























According to the OECD and as shown in Figure 1, taxes and contributions levied on 
gross earnings form three levels of burden: (1) the tax burden – which represents the share 
of personal income tax in the gross wage; (2) the net tax burden or personal average tax 
rate – which is the share of all employee tax liabilities in the gross wage, i.e. the share of 
the sum of personal income tax and social security contributions paid by employee in the 
gross wage; and (3) the total tax burden or the so called tax wedge – which represents the 
sum of personal income tax and employee and employer social security contributions to-
gether with any payroll tax expressed as a percentage of labour costs (OECD, 2005). 
In the equilibrium framework, Dalton’s law says that the effects on employment, la-
bour costs and net wages are the same, no matter who is taxed, employers or employees 
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(Muysken, van Veen, and de Regt, 1999). From basic microeconomic theory it is well 
known that the impact of labour costs on the size of the labour force is highly dependent 
on the elasticities of supply and demand curves (Figure 2), but also on the degree of flexi-
bility in the labour market (Gora et al., 2006; Nestić, 1998). For example, social security 
contributions paid by employers usually affect labour demand, while contributions paid 
by employees influence labour supply in the labour market. However, this does not have 
to hold, especially in the case of perfectly competitive labour and product markets. In an 
imperfectly competitive environment, which corresponds to the real world situation, the 
tax burden will be divided between employees and employers in accordance with their 
negotiating power, which depends both on the institutional environment as well as on the 
structure of labour and product markets (Nestić, 1998).
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Source: Authors’ plotting based on Boeri and van Ours (2008).
However, Muysken, van Veen, and de Regt (1999) by analysing data for the Net-
herlands in the period 1960-1995 found that Dalton’s law does not hold since the long 
run elasticities of employers’ and employees’ taxes with respect to unemployment differ 
greatly: 0.42 and 0.10, respectively. Yet since it is very hard to determine elasticities of 
labour supply and demand for the entire economy, elasticities are most often calculated 
on a sectoral basis (Gora et al., 2006). Still, results showed that the elasticities are higher 
for labour-intensive industries with lower-skilled workers. Many of the EU new member 
states, together with Croatia, have a relatively high share of employed persons in the pri-
mary and secondary sectors, which implies a greater influence of labour costs on the size 
of their labour supply than is the case with the EU old member states.
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Yet all this assumes the functioning of a perfectly competitive labour market, which 
rarely exists in practice. Modern labour markets, especially the European, are characteri-
sed by market imperfections and the existence of many institutions that serve to correct 
market failures. Boeri and van Ours (2008) emphasize the fact that taxes on labour cause 
different effects on different income groups mainly because of the characteristics of the 
tax-benefit system, primarily unemployment benefits. For instance, if, in one household, 
neither of the parents is working, the disincentive for one of them to accept a job is quite 
significant, but if one of them is already employed, the disincentives for the other to find 
employment are much smaller. Evidently, labour costs will exercise different impacts on 
the functioning of the labour market depending on the institutional characteristics. For in-
stance, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) found a correlation between taxes and unemployment 
across countries only when they differentiated groups of countries regarding the differen-
ces in their labour market institutions.
De Haan, Sturm, and Volkerink (2003), evaluating different proxies for the tax burden 
on labour, conclude that even though these proxies differ substantially, their correlation 
is quite high and that the significance of the impact of the tax burden on unemployment 
is not very sensitive with respect to the choice of particular indicator. The most important 
difference between different proxies used for the tax wedge is whether or not consumpti-
on taxes are included into the calculation of the tax wedge. According to Nickell (1997; 
2004), the total tax burden in the labour market is actually the sum of the personal avera-
ge tax rate and the consumption tax rate, where income taxes observed alone cannot tell 
much on the behaviour of agents in the labour market. Nickell (1997), in a cross-secti-
on analysis, showed that a fall in total tax burden by 10 percentage points reduces unem-
ployment by approximately 25 percent and raises labour supply by approximately 2 per-
cent. The same author (Nickell, 2004), using results from different empirical studies, con-
firmed similar outcomes, but stressed the fact that besides taxes, the differences in social 
security contributions are likely to be responsible for the differentials in the labour mar-
ket indicators between countries.
In the work by Mortensen and Pissarides (2002), where various tax and subsidy ef-
fects on wages and (un)employment are evaluated within their search and matching fra-
mework, it is shown that wage and employment subsidies increase both employment and 
wages. In addition, hiring subsidies reduce unemployment duration, but increases the inci-
dence where effects on total employment remain indeterminate. Firing taxes, on the other 
hand, have reverse effects, with employment effects remaining uncertain. 
Behar (2009) evaluates the impact of tax wedges and unemployment benefits on labo-
ur market outcomes (employment, unemployment and inactivity) in the CEE-10 EU mem-
ber states. His results show that the new EU member states share similar characteristics, 
which differentiate them from the old EU member states, i.e. even if they do have bad la-
bour market outcomes, their institutions and labour market policies are more flexible than 
in the rest of the Europe. In addition, he demonstrates how of all the institutional explana-
tions for the differences in labour market outcomes, the tax wedge and the benefit system 
are chief candidates. Furthermore, Gora et al. (2006) show how the tax wedge creates es-
pecially undesirable effects for the unskilled, i.e. low wage earners. They hold that the re-
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lative tax burden for this group is higher in the new member states (NMS) than in EU-15, 
because of the relative endowment of the new member states in low-skilled labour.
Dolenc and Vodopivec (2005) found that OECD countries could be classified into two 
groups taking their tax wedge, employment and unemployment rates into consideration. 
The first group has a high tax wedge, a low employment and high unemployment rate, 
while for the second the opposite holds true. In addition, they state that EU members are 
generally characterised by a higher tax burden on labour and higher unemployment rates 
than OECD countries, with Slovenia being one of the EU countries with the highest tax 
wedge. They suggest that Slovenia could benefit from a reduction of the tax burden on its 
labour, but emphasizing that tax reduction alone would not be enough to reduce unem-
ployment and boost employment.
Something similar has been shown in Grdović Gnip and Tomić (2009) by using 2006 
data for 38 countries (EU and OECD members, plus Croatia). Cluster analysis showed 
that a high unemployment rate is evidenced in countries with higher tax wedge, while a 
higher employment rate is registered in countries with a lower tax wedge. Croatia came 
out as a country with a high tax wedge and a high unemployment rate, primarily because 
of the high social security contributions paid by employees. They conclude that possible 
labour tax reduction could enhance employment and result in higher competitiveness of 
the labour supply, but with more challenges than benefits in the short run. 
Kesner-Škreb (2007) also emphasises high social security contributions paid by em-
ployees as the main source of burdens for labour in Croatia. She states that it is not ne-
cessary to increase the tax burden via the introduction of new forms of taxation because 
the tax burden in Croatia is already one of the highest in the CEE countries. She proposes 
just the opposite, i.e. starting to unburden both the economy and the people, primarily by 
reducing contributions in order to reduce labour costs and increase the competitive ness 
of the economy. Additionally, Urban (2009b) compares the tax wedge in OECD coun-
tries and Croatia in 2008 and concludes that the tax wedge in Croatia has a value similar 
to that in neighbouring countries, but higher than the average OECD country value. The 
same holds when the new “crisis tax” is added to the calculation for Croatia.
Nestić (1998) suggested lowering the tax burden on labour in Croatia, not to lower 
high unemployment rates, but primarily to increase the competitiveness of Croatian eco-
nomy and to reduce informal sector employment. On the other hand, Nestić (2009), com-
paring the tax wedge between European countries and Croatia, concludes that frequent 
remarks about the above average tax burden on wages in Croatia do not hold. 
3 Labour market and taxing wages in Croatia 
3.1 Labour market: Croatia in the context of the European Union 
Placing the Croatian labour market in the EU framework gives an interesting picture. 
Figure 3 presents structure of the working-age population of the EU countries plus Croatia 
by their economic activity. In almost all of the countries, almost 30 percent of the popu-
lation aged from 15 to 64 is inactive. This implies a high share of dependent population, 
with an emphasis on the increasing share of the dependent elderly population. In addition, 
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among the active population, different shares of employed and unemployed populations 
are noticeable. Old member states show relatively better results compared to the new sta-
tes and to accession countries. The two “ends” are represented by Malta, with a very low 
share of active population (around 60%), and Denmark, with a very high share of active 
working-age population (around 80%). Croatia belongs to the “low end” of the distribu-
tion with a 37% share of inactive people among the working age population.
The main reason for inactivity in the working-age population in most of these co-
untries is that these people are still attending some form of education or training. On the 
other hand, in countries like the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Croatia a high share of 
the inactive population in this group is already retired. This is the result of the early re-
tirement schemes and disability pensions in these countries. Other reasons include ill-
ness, disability, or some family responsibilities. An interesting part of this group consists 
of those who “think no work is available” and represent some discouraged people who 
would work but think that there is no vacant positions for them, and the highest share of 
this group, after Bulgaria and Italy (9.3% and 9.2%, respectively) exists in Croatia (5,1% 
of inactive working-age population).
Figure 3: Working-age (15-64) population structure by economic activity (in %), 2008
Source: Eurostat, 2009. 
Table 1 shows some specific characteristics of the active population among the new 
member states of the EU countries plus Croatia. Croatia demonstrates one of the lowest 
activity rates in all indicators presented in the table. So, the total activity rate among the 
working-age population in Croatia is only 63.2 percent, while for the total EU it is 70.9 
percent in the year 2008. These activity rates show that Croatian labour force is well un-
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Low activity and employment rates for the two end age groups (15-24 and 55-64) in-
dicates the low flexibility of the Croatian labour market in which there is no possibility 
for part-time employment or other schemes for those in education or those with decrea-
sed abilities. In addition, the activity rate for the female population is lower in each age 
group with the highest difference in the end-groups. Females are equal to males when it 
Table 1:  Activity rates by gender, age groups and highest level of education attained 
for the working-age population, 2008 (in %)
Country Total 
Gender Age groups Education (ISCED)
Females Males 15-24 25-54 55-64 0-2 3-4 5-6
EU-27 70.9 63.9 78.0 44.5 84.8 48.1 54.3 75.6 87.2
EU-15 72.5 65.4 79.5 48.4 85.3 50.0 57.7 77.5 87.3
Belgium 67.1 60.8 73.3 33.4 85.7 36.1 45.4 72.0 86.2
Bulgaria 67.8 63.1 72.5 30.1 85.5 48.7 38.7 76.2 88.1
Czech Republic 69.7 61.0 78.1 31.1 87.3 49.5 29.9 75.8 84.7
Denmark 80.8 77.1 84.4 72.5 90.2 58.7 68.3 83.9 90.8
Germany 76.5 70.8 82.1 52.5 87.9 58.8 54.3 80.5 89.4
Estonia 74.0 70.1 78.3 41.4 88.1 65.1 39.8 80.1 87.9
Ireland 72.0 63.1 80.7 52.5 81.6 55.5 52.2 76.6 87.4
Greece 67.1 55.1 79.1 30.2 82.0 44.2 56.8 67.1 87.7
Spain 72.6 63.2 81.8 47.7 83.8 49.2 65.6 75.4 87.3
France 70.1 65.6 74.8 39.2 88.7 40.0 53.2 74.8 84.7
Italy 63.0 51.6 74.4 30.9 78.1 35.5 50.3 72.3 82.3
Cyprus 73.6 65.7 82.0 41.7 86.5 56.6 53.7 76.9 89.1
Latvia 74.4 70.5 78.6 42.9 88.9 63.3 43.4 80.7 90.7
Lithuania 68.4 65.5 71.4 30.8 85.5 55.6 24.0 73.0 90.5
Luxembourg 66.8 58.7 74.7 29.0 83.4 35.1 51.8 69.4 85.7
Hungary 61.5 55.0 68.3 25.0 80.1 33.1 33.5 68.2 81.8
Malta 58.8 40.2 76.9 52.2 70.8 30.4 50.5 74.6 86.6
Netherlands 79.3 73.3 85.3 73.2 88.5 54.7 65.8 82.8 89.4
Austria 75.0 68.6 81.4 60.8 87.3 41.9 55.5 79.7 87.6
Poland 63.8 57.0 70.9 33.1 82.5 33.3 29.3 68.4 87.0
Portugal 74.2 68.9 79.5 41.6 88.0 54.4 71.8 71.5 91.0
Romania 62.9 55.2 70.6 30.4 78.3 44.2 44.8 67.5 88.1
Slovenia 71.8 67.5 75.8 42.9 90.1 34.2 45.9 75.3 90.6
Slovakia 68.8 61.3 76.4 32.4 87.8 41.9 26.3 76.3 87.0
Finland 76.0 73.9 77.9 53.5 88.6 59.7 53.2 80.2 88.5
Sweden 79.3 76.9 81.7 52.8 90.4 72.8 61.0 85.2 91.3
United Kingdom 75.8 69.4 82.4 61.7 84.9 59.9 62.7 79.5 87.8
Croatia 63.2 56.6 70.0 34.7 80.9 38.8 39.3 68.6 86.1
Source: Eurostat, 2009.
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comes to employment rates only in the group of people with tertiary education, where the 
activity rate is well above average (around 86%), while for those with only primary edu-
cation the activity rate moves only around 39 percent.
Comparing Croatia with the new EU countries for the year 2007 it is observable that 
Croatia has one of the highest total labour costs (Figure 4). According to Nestić (2009), 
employers often use this comparison as an argument to judge the adverse competitive po-
sition of Croatian companies in relation to companies from the countries in the region. 
FDI in Croatia is indeed much lower1 than in some of the EU new member states. One of 
the reasons for this might be high labour costs. Nestić (2009) also emphasizes that even 
though Croatia has a relatively high level of wages compared to other CEE countries it 
had the smallest increase in wages, expressed in euro, in the period 1996-2006 (this is es-
pecially applicable to the period after the year 2000), which shows a convergence in the 
level of wages in the region. 
Yet, looking only at total labour costs, one can easily be misled due to the fact that 
total labour costs are composed quite differently in each country. Moreover, if we com-
pare the productivity of labour2 together with total labour costs (Figure 4), we can see that 
Croatian total labour costs are not that high in the whole EU context. However, the price 
of labour is less important in modern, technologically advanced economies. In labour-in-
tensive industries this factor is very important. Since Croatia is still behind the most ad-
vanced economies and has to compete for foreign investments with other countries in Ea-
stern Europe its total labour costs must be considered relatively high. 
In addition, the Croatian labour market is considered to be pretty rigid; actually it is 
among the countries that have the most rigid employment protection legislation in Euro-
pe (Matković and Biondić, 2003; Rutkowski, 2003). When one considers the inadequate 
qualification structure of its labour force (Bejaković, 2004) and the very low activity, the 
situation seems even worse. For instance, in 2008 36.8 percent of the working-age po-
pulation (15-64) was officially inactive. In addition, demographic ageing is exacerbating 
the current situation. As Obadić (2004) states, this implies low utilization of human reso-
urces, which leads to lower levels of production and economic welfare, and finally, to a 
lower level of competitiveness in the labour market.
Figure 5 shows some recent trends in the Croatian labour market. It is noticeable that 
the activity rate only slightly declined during the observed period (2002-2008). However, 
the structure of the active population has changed. The employment rate slightly increa-
sed while both the administrative as well as the ILO unemployment rate decreased on ave-
rage. However, the thing that worries is the high share of those who are unemployed for 
more than 12 months (55.2% of total unemployed persons in 2008). The positive trend in 
the labour market is a result of high economic growth during the same period3. However, 
due to the world financial crisis, this trend should slow down in 2009 and 2010.
1 For instance, in 2006 direct investment flows as a percentage of GDP in the reporting economy were 23.8% in 
Bulgaria; 17.7% in Hungary; 9.2% in Romania; 8.4% in Slovakia; and only 7.9% in Croatia (Eurostat, 2009).
2 Here, the productivity of the labour is measured as GDP in purchasing power standards per person em -
ployed.
3 According to the data from Croatian National Bank, the average GDP growth rate in the same period was 
4.24%.
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Source: CBS, 2009. 
All this shows the scarcity of labour supply in Croatia. There could be a number of 
reasons for this situation. Perhaps labour demand is too low, and the discouraged wor-
kers are becoming inactive. Possibly different benefits schemes motivate people to leave 
Figure 5: Trends in the Croatian labour market, 2000-2008







*Total labour costs for Slovenia are for 2006.
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the labour force or, maybe, there are just not enough people who could actually work in 
Croatia. 
3.2 Taxing wages in Croatia
Croatian personal income tax legislation went through numerous changes, amen-
dments and revisions since its introduction in 1994. Undertaken adjustments referred to 
changes in all spheres, i.e. personal allowances, tax brackets, tax rates, other allowances, 
and deductions. Although the first changes in the fundamentals of personal income taxati-
on in Croatia appeared already after the first month of its implementation, when the level 
of personal allowance was raised for the first time, key changes occurred in two periods: 
(1) in year 2000, when income from dividends and profit shares became a taxable inco-
me category4; higher personal allowances for workers domiciled in the areas of special 
national concern were brought in, and a third tax bracket with an appropriate tax rate was 
introduced; and (2) in year 2003 when the fourth tax rate (for the appropriate tax bracket) 
with different allowances and deductions5 was introduced (see Appendix 1, Table A1). 
Closely related to income taxation and subject to numerous changes is the social se-
curity system (see Appendix 1, Table A2), which embraces six different contributions: 
pension insurance, health insurance, occupational injuries, employment, child allowan-
ces, and water management. All of these, except the water management contribution, were 
until 2003 split between employees and employers. From 2003 onwards, the contributi-
ons are no longer “shared” among employees and employers. There is a clear distincti-
on that contributions for pension insurance are paid by employees only, while employers 
pay the contributions for health insurance, occupational injuries and employment. The-
refore, in Croatia employees have 20% taken from their gross earnings for social securi-
ty contributions, while employers pay an additional 17.2% of employees’ gross earning 
for the same purpose. 
Evidently, in a period of less than 20 years, numerous changes in both the taxati-
on as well as the contribution system have taken place. Worth mentioning is that frequ-
ent changes in the taxation system create an atmosphere of instability, which discourages 
both sides in the labour market (employers and employees) from quickly and optimally 
responding to market signals (Nestić, 1998). 
In the nineties the OECD started to identify representative taxpayers and to calcula-
te the amount of their taxes. Achievement of this goal has been in the OECD focus since 
then, and the Organisation developed a methodology for calculating income tax burdens, 
i.e. tax wedges, which has been broadly accepted and became representative all over the 
world. 
The pillar of the methodology until 2003 was represented by the manufacturing sec-
tor, i.e. sector D according to the NACE6. In 2004 the OECD concluded that the manu-
4 According to the previous personal income tax legislation, the taxable income category included wages, sala-
ries, pensions, self-employment income and rents.
5 The introduced allowances and deductions included life- and health-premiums, voluntary pension insurance, 
health protection and medical treatment outlays, health insurance, paid rent and mortgage. 
6 NACE stands for “statistical Nomenclature of economic Activities in the European Community” and is used 
to designate the consecutive versions of the statistical nomenclature relating to economic activities developed by the 
European Union since 1970. 
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facturing sector alone may not be representative any longer due to a constant lowering of 
the share of employed persons in that sector7, and extended its definition to NACE sec-
tors from C to K8. According to the broadening of industry coverage the main focus swit-
ched to the single “average worker” instead of the previously defined “average production 
worker”9. The “average production worker” was defined as an adult full-time production 
worker in the manufacturing sector whose wage earnings are equal to the average wage 
earnings of such workers (OECD, 2005), while the “average worker” corresponds to the 
same worker operating in sectors C to K and therefore is rather called “industry worker” 
than “manufacturing worker”.
According to this, an average worker in the industry sector (C-K) in Croatia is con-
sidered in all the following calculations (from now on, average worker is meant as indu-
stry worker, single and without children). It needs to be emphasized that the personal in-
come tax in Croatia, apart from the standard income tax, includes also a surtax that is le-
vied on the amount of the calculated income tax liability. The tax rate of the income sur-
tax differs among local authorities, as it represents a local tax and local authorities have 
complete jurisdiction over it10. The personal income category therefore includes the sur-
tax too (taken into consideration below). Because every local authority can individually 
decide about the introduction and the rate of such surtax, a weighted average11 among 
local authorities is calculated and the weighted average income surtax rate in Croatia tur-
ned out to be 11.16%12. 
Figure 6 shows the tax wedge and personal average tax rate for a Croatian average 
industry worker at different wage levels from 1994 to 2009. The tax wedge represents 
the sum of personal income tax and employee and employer social security contributions 
expressed as percentage of total labour costs, while the personal average tax rate is defi-
ned, according to the OECD definition, as the sum of personal income and employee so-
cial security contributions expressed as a percentage of gross wage earnings. 
The highest tax wedge and personal average tax rate in Croatia were registered in 
1994 when the personal income synthetic taxation was introduced (at 100% average wage 
level it is 52.02% of total labour costs and 41.18% of gross wage, respectively). From 
2000 onwards, at the 100% wage level the tax wedge moved around 40.33% of total la-
7 The OECD noticed that the share of workers in the manufacturing sector was constantly falling in the nineties. 
Average earnings of workers employed in the manufacturing sector became increasingly less representative and less 
“typical”. Therefore the OECD decided that average earnings should be determined on the basis of employees working 
in a broadened set of industries and specifically decided to include categories C to K (more in OECD, 2004).
8 To the “pure” manufacturing sector (D); the OECD added: mining and quarrying (C); electricity, gas and water 
supply (E); construction (F); wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, personal and house-
hold goods (G); hotels and restaurants (H); transport, storage and communications (I); financial intermediation (J); 
and real estate, renting and business activities (K).
9 It is worth mentioning that the OECD covers tax burden calculations for different family-types (married, with 
or without children) and different wage levels too.
10 Every city and county in Croatia may introduce personal income surtax as part of their tax revenues. A county 
can regulate a surtax rate up to 10%, a city with fewer than 30,000 inhabitants up to 12%, a city with more than 30,000 
inhabitants up to 15% and the city of Zagreb up to 30%. There are 126 cities and 429 counties in Croatia. From those, 
78 cities and 178 counties have introduced the personal income surtax in their tax systems. 
11 The weighted average income surtax rate is calculated by taking as respective weights the number of persons 
living in the city/county according to the Population Census data from 2001.
12 This percentage is taken into account for calculating all income tax burden categories in this paper. 
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bour costs while the personal average tax rate was around 30%. The difference between 
the two indicators in all observed periods was between 10 and 11.3 percentage points, i.e. 
10.9% on average. In 1998 the difference between the tax wedge and the personal avera-
ge tax rate attained 13.9% due to a 9.7% increase in gross wage and a slightly higher de-
crease in employee social security contributions than those paid by employers. 
On average, no matter what wage level is taken into account, between 1994 and 
2009 both the tax wedge and the personal average tax rate registered annual decrements. 
For the 100% average wage level these decrements result in annual changes of 1.8% and 
2.3% respectively, which accounts for a total decrement of about 12% approximately for 
each indicator.
Figure 6:  Tax wedge (TW) and personal average tax rate (PATR) for a Croatian 
average industry worker13 at the different wage levels from 1994 to 2009 
(in %)
Note: The tax wedge and the personal average rate for years that experienced changes in the inco-
me taxation system and/or social security contributions (see Appendix 1, Tables A1 and A2) are shown 
as annual averages of monthly resulting tax wedges and personal income tax rates, so to take all chan-
ges into account. 
*For 2009 the calculation is based on averaging available data from January to November, with-
o ut considering the “crisis tax”.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
13 Although until 2004 OECD defined a manufacturing worker as one working in sector D according to NACE, 
Figure 6 (and other figures that resulted from the authors’ calculation of the tax burden prior to year 2004) shows tax 
wedge and personal average tax rate calculations based on average earnings of an industry worker in the broadened 
set of industries (C-K) for all the observed periods. The calculation of the same indicators based just on sector D’s 
average gross wage did not show any significant differences from the up-to-date calculation methodology. Differen-
ces were at most large 0.2 percentage points.
*
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The newest change in the personal income taxation introduced in July 2009 is the “cri-
sis tax”. It is a tax levied on the net wage, and represents another burden shouldered by 
employees, as it additionally decreases their net wage14. The Croatian government intro-
duced this new form of taxing labour in 2009 in order to alleviate the impact of the finan-
cial crisis. If this is taken into account as a part of the total personal income tax paid by 
the employees at 100% average wage level, the total tax wedge for Croatia in 2009 comes 
to 41.32%, which generates a 1.2 percentage points higher burden (without considering 
this, it is 40.13%), while the personal average tax rate amounts to 31.23%, i.e. increases 
by 1.4 percentage points (without the “crisis tax” it amounts to 29.83%). 
The decomposition of total labour costs for an average industry worker at the 100% 
wage level in Croatia shows that around 40% goes for tax and contribution payments, 
while the remaining 60% is left to employees as net wage (Figure 7). 
Figure 7:  Structure of labour costs for an average industry worker in Croatia at the 
100% wage level in the period between 1994 and 2009 (in %)
*For 2009 the calculation is based on averaging available data from January to November, exc-
luding the “crisis tax”. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
From 2000 onward, a stabilisation among labour cost categories can be noticed, due 
to there being fewer changes in both the personal income taxation and the social securi-
ty contribution system (see Appendix 1). The level of the net wage is on average around 
14 The “crisis tax” is applied to the net wage as its tax basis. It is not levied on net wages under 3,000.00 kuna. 
Net wages between 3,000.00 and 6,000.00 kuna are subject to the rate of 2%, while on a net wage above 6,000.00 
kuna a 4% “crisis tax” is levied. More about this in Urban (2009a).
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56.98% of total labour costs, but it is worth noticing that in the last observed peri ods it 
was 2.89 two percentage points higher than the average for the whole period, while in the 
nineties it was even 9.01 percentage points lower (1994). On average, 33.74% of total la-
bour costs consist of social security contribution payments, while 9.41% goes for perso-
nal income tax costs.
In the structure of the tax wedge of an average industry worker at 100% wage level, 
social security contributions dominate. The portion of paid personal income tax is aro-
und 20% of the tax wedge, while the total of employee and employer social security con-
tributions exceeds two-thirds of the tax wedge. If the “crisis tax” is considered for 2009, 
then the structure slightly changes. The share of total social security contributions de-
creases from 79.1% to 76.81%, while the share of personal income tax increases from 
20.9% to 23.19%. 
In the observed period (1994-2009) approximately 45% of total labour costs went for 
social security contributions and income tax-payments in Croatia, from which approxi-
mately 65% was paid by an average industry worker, who actually gave up 35% of gross 
wage for tax and contribution payments. The constituent components of those 45% were 
approximately 76% due to the high social security contributions in Croatia, while just 
24% was due to personal income tax. Similarly, from the 35% approximately two-thirds 
on average went for social security contribution payments, the rest for personal income 
tax. The higher level of tax burdens, especially high contributions in the transition co-
untries, is a consequence of the frequent early retirement of workers laid off during the 
restructuring process and the growth of social expenditures that were concomitant upon 
high unemployment (Petrović, 2007). 
If the Croatian labour taxing system is brought in a broadened picture including EU 
and OECD member states a few other things can be noticed. It is important to stress that 
in the period between 1996 and 2008 the average tax wedge (at 100% average wage 
level) in EU member states was 37.9% and it is possible to say that it was almost con-
stant through the whole period (standard deviation 0.5%). The average tax wedge among 
old member states (EU-15) was slightly higher (39.5%), while among new member states 
(NMS-12) it was somewhat lower (35.91%), but both registered a constant trend. If addi-
tionally OECD countries (except EU countries members of OECD) are considered none 
of the countries registers a tax wedge level above the EU-27 average. 
4 Empirical analysis: a Croatian versus a European worker
In order to determine the impact of the total labour costs on the size of the labour force 
a differentiation between total labour costs and net earnings needs to be made. The dif-
ference between net earnings in Croatia and the EU countries is somewhat smaller than 
that in total labour costs. Moreover, the structure of labour costs differs greatly among 
countries. For instance, while for both the EU-15 and the NMS-12 social security contri-
butions paid by employers make the highest share in the difference between total labour 
costs and net earnings, for Croatia and Slovenia the biggest part of this difference consi-
sts of the social security contributions paid by employees. 
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If different wage levels are taken into account (Table 2) it is noticeable that an avera-
ge Croatian worker bears a higher tax burden at lower wage level (67%) than an average 
European worker. The opposite is true for a higher wage level (167%), when the Europe-
an worker from the old member states bears more of a tax burden than the same Croati-
an colleague, while a similar worker from the new member states remains still less taxed. 
Although the same conclusion refers to the tax wedge and personal average tax rate, the 
difference is higher when the latter is observed. 
Two opposite trends are to be noticed. If the tax wedge is considered, then when mo-
ving from a lower to a higher wage level the rank of Croatia amid all the EU member sta-
tes increases. This means that when countries are ranked according to the tax wedge level 
(from highest to lowest) Croatia assumes the 18th position at the 67% wage level and the 
15th place at the 167% wage level. When the personal average tax rate is analysed the op-
posite trend is registered, i.e. the lower the wage level the higher the ranking position of 
Croatia amid EU member states. This means that when countries are ranked according 
to the personal average tax rate (from highest to lowest) Croatia takes the 8th place at the 
67% wage level, but the 11th at the 167% wage level. Similar movements are characte-
ristic of old member states plus Slovenia and Hungary, while other new member states 
register a decline in the ranking position when the wage level increases for both burden 
measurements, i.e. for the tax wedge and personal average tax rate. 
Typically, countries with a higher tax wedge have lower employment and higher 
unemployment rates. Even though this is given straightforwardly, hierarchical and K-
means clustering provide more evidence for this relation between the labour costs, proxi-
ed by tax wedge or personal average tax rate, and the main indicators of the size of the la-
bour supply, i.e. employment and unemployment rates15.
The cluster analysis gathers cases in relatively homogenous groups based on some de-
pendent characteristics. In this way, the dependent characteristics are tax wedge (or perso-
nal average tax rate) at 100% average wage level, employment and unemployment rates 
in 200816, while cases are represented by an efficient sample of 28 countries, i.e. members 
of the European Union plus Croatia. Hierarchical clustering using the Ward method and 
squared Euclidean distance as a measure function, grouped countries into three main clu-
sters depending on the size of tax wedge, employment and unemployment rates17. Table 
3 shows some descriptive statistics for the three clusters.
The first cluster is a group of 16 countries, i.e. 57% of the sample that registered a 
lower tax wedge, lower unemployment rate and higher employment rate. The second clu-
ster is a group of nine countries, i.e. 32% of the whole sample that registered a higher tax 
wedge and a higher unemployment rate than countries from the first cluster. The three co-
untries in the third cluster (Malta, Cyprus and Ireland) represent the low end of the distri-
bution and significantly “rebound” from the sample. Therefore, they are excluded from the 
15 Data used in the cluster analysis are shown in Appendix 2. 
16 For seven countries, data for 2007 are used, as those for 2008 were not available. These countries are Bulga-
ria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Malta, and Romania, while for Slovenia the latest available data are for 2006. 
All of these are marked with *.
17 In order to prove stability, same clustering is done by changing the order of cases, because in hierarchical clu-
stering solutions may depend upon order of cases (it accounts for all hierarchical clustering in this paper).
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first two clusters. The smallest variances in all three variables among countries are shown 
in the second cluster, while the highest variances are registered among the three countries 
separately classified in the third cluster. Croatia is grouped among countries with a high 
tax wedge and high unemployment rate, because of the strong correlation between these 
Table 2:  Tax wedge and personal average tax rate for an average industry worker at 
different wage levels (as % of labour costs) in 2008 
Wage level
Tax wedge (as % of total 
labour costs) Wage level
Personal average tax rate 
(as % of gross wage)
67% 100% 167% 67% 100% 167%
Austria 44.4 48.8 50.9 Austria 28.2 33.9 38.1
Belgium 50.3 56.0 61.1 Belgium 36.0 42.5 49.3
Bulgariaa 32.0 36.5 40.0 Bulgariaa 16.0 21.5 25.0
Cyprusa 12.0 13.9 21.0 Cyprusa 12.0 8.5 16.0
Czech Republic 40.0 43.4 46.1 Czech Republic 19.0 23.6 27.3
Germany 47.3 52.0 52.6 Germany 37.0 42.7 45.6
Denmark 38.9 41.2 49.7 Denmark 38.4 40.9 49.6
Estoniaa 39.0 38.7 41.0 Estoniaa 18.0 20.2 22.0
Spain 33.8 37.8 41.5 Spain 13.9 19.0 24.3
Finland 38.3 43.5 49.3 Finland 23.4 30.0 37.2
France 45.5 49.3 53.2 France 25.9 27.8 33.3
Greece 37.6 42.4 47.5 Greece 20.1 26.3 32.7
Hungary 46.7 54.1 59.1 Hungary 28.0 38.3 45.1
Ireland 16.0 22.9 34.0 Ireland 7.0 14.6 26.9
Italy 43.0 46.5 51.6 Italy 24.7 29.3 36.0
Lithuaniaa 41.0 43.0 44.0 Lithuaniaa 23.0 25.3 27.0
Luxembourg 29.6 35.9 42.8 Luxembourg 20.0 27.2 35.1
Latviaa 41.0 42.4 43.0 Latviaa 27.0 28.6 30.0
Maltaa 19.0 23.6 33.0 Maltaa 12.0 17.8 28.0
Netherlands 41.7 45.0 46.6 Netherlands 31.8 36.1 41.1
Poland 38.7 39.7 41.3 Poland 27.3 28.6 30.5
Portugal 32.9 37.6 43.5 Portugal 17.0 22.8 30.1
Romaniaa 42.0 43.4 45.0 Romaniaa 26.0 27.8 30.0
Sweden 42.5 44.6 52.6 Sweden 23.8 26.7 37.2
Sloveniaa 40.0 44.0 50.0 Sloveniaa 30.0 34.3 40.0
Slovakia 36.1 38.9 40.7 Slovakia 19.3 22.8 25.4
United Kingdom 29.7 32.8 37.5 United Kingdom 22.9 25.6 30.3
Croatia 38.1 40.1 44.4 Croatia 27.5 30.5 35.2
EU-27 37.0 40.6 45.1 EU-27 23.4 27.6 33.2
EU-15 38.1 42.4 47.6 EU-15 24.7 29.7 36.5
NMS-12 35.6 38.5 42.0 NMS-12 21.5 24.7 28.9
a Data are for 2007.
 Source: OECD (2009); Eurostat (2009); Authors’ calculation for Croatia.
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two variables. Two facts are worth noticing: (1) among all countries, no matter the clu-
ster in which they are classified, Spain and Croatia had the highest unemployment rates 
(11.4% and 8.6%, respectively), and (2) there are nine18 countries classified in the first 
cluster (lower tax wedge and lower unemployment rate), although they register a higher 
tax wedge than Croatia. Evidently, it is not only the income taxation system that is res-
ponsible for high employment rates. This will be discussed below. 
Figure 8 shows the hierarchical clustering using the dendrogram. As the dendrogram 
shows, countries in the first cluster (Table 3) can be divided into two additional “sub-clu-
sters”: one gathering Bulgaria, Luxembourg, Spain, Slovakia, Estonia, Portugal, and Uni-
ted Kingdom, whose tax wedges and unemployment rates are lower; and the other consi-
sting of Austria, Germany, Lithuania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, Sweden 
and Denmark, whose tax wedges and unemployment rates are higher. 
In order to show the appropriate values of tax wedge, unemployment and employment 
rate in the cluster centres and the distance between these centres, K-means cluster analy-
18 Those countries are: Latvia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Finland, Slovenia, Sweden, Austria, Germany and 
Denmark.
Table 3:  Cluster statistics using Ward method in hierarchical clustering (variables: tax 
wedge, employment and unemployment rates)





Employment rate 62.3 78.1 69.1 4.2 16 countries
BG* LU ES SK EE* PT 
UK AT DE LT* SI* CZ 
FI LV* SE DK 
Unemployment rate 3.4 11.4 6.3 2.1
Tax wedge 32.8 52.0 41.3 4.9
Cluster 2
Employment rate 55.3 64.9 60.3 3.1 9 countries
BE HU FR PL HR GR 
IT RO* NL
Unemployment rate 2.7 8.6 6.8 1.7
Tax wedge 39.7 56.0 46.3 5.8
Cluster 3
Employment rate 56.7 70.9 65.0 7.4
3 countries 
IE CY* MT*
Unemployment rate 3.8 6.1 5.3 1.3
Tax wedge 11.9 22.9 17.8 5.5
Total
Employment rate 55.3 78.1 65.9 5.8
28 countriesUnemployment rate 2.7 11.4 6.4 1.9
Tax wedge 11.9 56.0 40.6 9.1
Note: All variables are significant at the 95% level.
AT – Austria, BE – Belgium, BG – Bulgaria, CY – Cyprus, CZ – Czech Republic, DE – Germany, 
DK – Denmark, EE – Estonia, ES – Spain, FI – Finland, FR – France, GR – Greece, HR – Croatia, 
HU – Hungary, IE – Ireland, IT – Italy, LT – Lithuania, LU – Luxembourg, LV – Latvia, MT – Malta, 
NL – Netherlands, PL – Poland, PT – Portugal, RO – Romania, SE – Sweden, SI – Slovenia, 
SK – Slovakia, UK – United Kingdom.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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sis is carried out. This analysis does not show the same cluster participation for all coun-
tries. Table 4 shows values at initial and final cluster centroids. The initial cluster centres 
are vectors with values based on the tax wedge, employment and unemployment rates, 
which refer to the countries with the lowest tax wedge (cluster 3), lower tax wedge (or 
middle tax wedge – cluster 1) and countries with highest tax wedge (cluster 2). Final clu-
ster centres are reached doing three iterations, when the process of redistribution of the 
units stops and there are no further changes to the cluster centres. The variability among 
countries is minimised when the tax wedge in cluster one assumes the value of 40.3% of 
total labour costs, the centre of the tax wedge in cluster two assumes the value of 50.2% 
of total labour costs, and the centre of the tax wedge in cluster three assumes the value of 
20.1% of total labour costs. 
Figure 8: Dendrogram using the Ward method in hierarchical clustering
AT – Austria, BE – Belgium, BG – Bulgaria, CY – Cyprus, CZ – Czech Republic, DE – Germany, 
DK – Denmark, EE – Estonia, ES – Spain, FI – Finland, FR – France, GR – Greece, HR – Croatia, 
HU – Hungary, IE – Ireland, IT – Italy, LT – Lithuania, LU – Luxembourg, LV – Latvia, MT – Malta, 
NL – Netherlands, PL – Poland, PT – Portugal, RO – Romania, SE – Sweden, SI – Slovenia, 
SK – Slovakia, UK – United Kingdom.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Important to notice is that Austria and Germany switched their participation from the 
first cluster (according to hierarchical clustering) to the second cluster (according to K-
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means), i.e. from lower tax wedge to higher tax wedge cluster. Something similar, but in 
the opposite direction, happened to Greece, Poland, Romania and Croatia, meaning the 
change from a higher tax wedge cluster to a lower tax wedge cluster. Although these co-
untries may be considered “marginal cases” it is important to say that hierarchical cluste-
ring identifies relatively homogenous groups of cases based on the selected characteristics 
taking the similarity measures into account, while, oppositely, K-means clustering does 
not compute distances between all pairs of cases and does not take similarity between va-
riables into account. Therefore, changes among classifications may occur. According to 
variables inserted in the cluster analysis, to the importance of the linkage between them 
and to the purpose of the analysis (i.e. finding relations of cause and effect among the three 
variables), hierarchical clustering gives more suitable and significant results. That is be-
cause relationship and connection among employment, unemployment and tax wedge is 
analysed, and this classifying method takes the previously mentioned similarity measure 
into account. Also, worth noticing is that for the first two clusters mean values, i.e. valu-
es in the cluster centres, amid hierarchical and K-means clustering, significantly differ, 
as a consequence of taking or not similarity measures into account.











Employment rate 64.0 67.0 18 countries
BG* LU ES SK EE* PT UK LT* SI* 
CZ FI LV* SE DK GR PL RO* HR 
Unemployment rate 11.4 6.6
Tax wedge 37.8 40.3
Cluster 2
Employment rate 62.0 64.0
7 countries
BE HU FR IT NL AT DE
Unemployment rate 7.0 6.2
Tax wedge 56.0 50.2
Cluster 3
Employment rate 71.0 65.0
3 countries 
IE CY* MT*
Unemployment rate 3.8 5.3
Tax wedge 13.9 20.1
Iteration History 
Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3
Cluster 1 5.417 1.032 0.000 Convergence achieved due to no or small 
change in cluster centres. The maximum 
absolute coordinate change for any centre is 
.000. The current iteration is 3. The minimum 
distance between initial centres is 18.820.
Cluster 2 6.039 0.000 0.000
Cluster 3 4.929 4.532 0.000
Note: All variables are significant at the 95% level.
AT – Austria, BE – Belgium, BG – Bulgaria, CY – Cyprus, CZ – Czech Republic, DE – Germany, 
DK – Denmark, EE – Estonia, ES – Spain, FI – Finland, FR – France, GR – Greece, HR – Croatia, 
HU – Hungary, IE – Ireland, IT – Italy, LT – Lithuania, LU – Luxembourg, LV – Latvia, MT – Malta, 
NL – Netherlands, PL – Poland, PT – Portugal, RO – Romania, SE – Sweden, SI – Slovenia, 
SK – Slovakia, UK – United Kingdom.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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As shown in table 2, while the Croatian tax wedge at the 100% average wage level 
moves around the EU-27 average in 2008, the personal average tax rate for the average 
Croatian worker at the 100% wage level in the same year is above the average rate registe-
red in old and new member states, and above the EU-27 average as well. This means that 
“European workers” on average bear a smaller burden, i.e. social security contributions 
paid by employers in EU countries represent a higher share in the overall tax wedge than 
in Croatia. Therefore, the same analysis is conducted using, instead of the tax wedge, the 
personal average tax rate at 100% average wage level. Results show Croatia even “closer” 
to countries with a higher tax burden and higher unemployment rate (Table 5).
Table 5 shows the results of the hierarchical clustering that differentiated three clu-
sters. The first cluster gathers countries with the lowest tax burden borne by an average 
worker. As well as Cyprus, Malta and Ireland, it is interesting to notice that several co-
untries, i.e. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Portugal, Spain and Slovakia are added to 
this cluster. When the tax wedge was used as a measure, these were gathered among co-
untries with a lower (but not the lowest) tax burden, and yet, when the personal average 
tax rate is taken into account, they appear among countries with the lowest tax burden. 
This is so, because social security contributions paid by employers register a high share 
in the total labour costs in these countries. 
Countries belonging to clusters two and three are mainly divided because of the diffe-
rences among employment and unemployment rates (when taking the similarity measures 
into account), not the personal average tax rate. It is possible to observe that the mean of 
the latter in cluster three is just 0.6 percentage points lower than in cluster two. Therefo-
re, the same conclusion may appear again, i.e. that Croatia is classified among countries 
with a high tax burden, low employment and high unemployment rate19. The Netherlands 
may be considered a special case or even a low end of the third cluster, because of its low 
employment rate (55.3%) and low unemployment rate (2.7%).
However, since countries with a higher tax wedge than Croatia may have lower unem-
ployment and/or higher employment rate, the tax burden on labour (expressed as tax wedge 
or personal average tax rate) alone cannot tell the whole story about the functioning of the 
labour market. Therefore, some additional factors need to be added into the analysis. The 
existing literature implies that the impact of labour costs on the size of the labour force 
is highly dependent on the degree of flexibility in the labour market. As already mentio-
ned, the Croatian labour market is not considered to be flexible, i.e. it has one of the most 
rigid legislations in Europe. The employment protection legislation index, developed by 
the OECD, measures the procedures and the costs involved in dismissing and in hiring 
workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts20. The greater the value of the 
index, the greater the overall strictness of employment protection legislation (see Appen-
dix 2). It is important to note that employment protection refers to only one dimension of 
19 Similar results appear when K-means clustering with personal average tax rate as a burden measure is taken 
into account. This classification method gathers nine countries (Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Sweden, Slovenia, Austria, 
Belgium, Germany and Hungary) with the highest tax burden, and leaves four of them (Cyprus, Ireland, Estonia and 
Malta) as those with lowest tax burden. Croatia remains classified among the same countries as in hierarchical cluste-
ring when the personal average tax rate is considered as the tax burden measure.
20 For details, see: www.oecd.org/employment/protection.
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the complex set of factors that influence labour market flexibility, but this indicator will 
serve for illustrative purposes in this paper.
Table 5:  Cluster statistics using the Ward method in hierarchical clustering (variables: 
personal average tax rate, employment and unemployment rates)





Employment rate 62.3 70.9 65.7 4.5 9 countries
BG* CZ EE* PT 
CY* MT* IE ES SK
Unemployment rate 3.8 11.4 6.7 2.5
Personal average tax rate 8.5 23.6 18.9 4.8
Cluster 2
Employment rate 68.6 78.1 71.8 3.1 9 countries
DK FI LT* LV* SE 
SI* UK AT DE 
Unemployment rate 3.4 7.6 5.7 1.5
Personal average tax rate 25.3 42.7 32.0 6.5
Cluster 3
Employment rate 55.3 64.9 60.7 7.4 10 countries 
LU BE FR GR HU 
IT NL PL RO* HR
Unemployment rate 2.7 8.6 6.7 1.7
Personal average tax rate 26.3 42.5 31.4 5.5
Total
Employment rate 55.3 78.1 65.9 5.8
28 countriesUnemployment rate 2.7 11.4 6.4 1.9
Personal average tax rate 8.5 42.7 27.6 8.1
Note: All variables are significant at the 95% level.
AT – Austria, BE – Belgium, BG – Bulgaria, CY – Cyprus, CZ – Czech Republic, DE – Germany, 
DK – Denmark, EE – Estonia, ES – Spain, FI – Finland, FR – France, GR – Greece, HR – Croatia, 
HU – Hungary, IE – Ireland, IT – Italy, LT – Lithuania, LU – Luxembourg, LV – Latvia, MT – Malta, 
NL – Netherlands, PL – Poland, PT – Portugal, RO – Romania, SE – Sweden, SI – Slovenia, 
SK – Slovakia, UK – United Kingdom.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
If the EPL index21, as one of the possible causes for (un)employment, is brought in 
to the hierarchical clustering along with the tax wedge, employment and unemployment 
rates, Croatia remains classified among countries with the highest tax wedges together 
with high labour market rigidity (Table 6). 
It is again observable that Croatia is clustered in this group because of its high labo-
ur market rigidity and high unemployment rate. The first cluster gathers countries with 
the lowest tax wedge and the lowest labour market rigidity, while the second cluster in-
cludes countries with a high (but not the highest) tax wedge and middle labour market 
flexibility22. Nevertheless, again we have a situation that even though both tax wedge and 
EPL index are higher in the second cluster, those countries have also higher employment 
rates (lower unemployment rates) than countries in the first cluster. This contradicts our 
21 Since its introduction in 1985, the OECD calculated three versions of the EPL index. In this paper, the second 
version that was worth in the period 1998-2008 is used. It includes the weighted sum of version 1 sub-indicators for 
regular contracts (EPR_v1, weight 5/12), temporary contracts (EPT_v1, weight 5/12) and collective dismissals (EPC, 
weight 2/12).
22 If the same variables are used in K-means clustering, similar conclusions appear. There are several countries 
that switched places, but Croatia remains among the countries with a high tax wedge and high labour market rigidity, 
along with Italy, Hungary, France, Belgium, Portugal, Netherlands and Poland.
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assumption that the introduction of a new variable in the form of the EPL index would re-
sult in “better” grouping of the countries according to their tax burden and its impact on 
the (un)employment rates. Evidently, in order to get a complete picture, additional varia-
bles would need to be included in the analysis. Yet, we were focused here on the impact 
of the tax burden on the labour market outcomes, and widening the analysis to new direc-
tions would probably take attention away from the main focus of this paper.
Table 6:  Cluster statistics using the Ward method in hierarchical clustering (variables: 
tax wedge, EPL index, employment and unemployment rates)





Employment rate 62.3 71.5 66.6 3.4
8 countries 
BG* EE* ES IE 
LU PT SK UK
Unemployment rate 5.1 11.4 7.2 2.3
Tax wedge 22.9 38.9 34.6 5.4
EPL index 1.1 3.4 2.2 0.8
Cluster 2
Employment rate 66.6 74.3 71.2 3.4
9 countries 
AT CZ DE DK FI 
LT* LV* SE SI*
Unemployment rate 3.4 7.7 5.6 1.6
Tax wedge 40.9 48.8 44.1 3.9
EPL index 1.8 2.8 2.3 0.3
Cluster 3
Employment rate 55.3 64.9 60.3 3.1
9 countries 
BE FR GR HU IT 
NL PL RO* HR
Unemployment rate 2.7 8.6 6.8 1.7
Tax wedge 39.7 56.0 46.2 5.9
EPL index 1.9 2.9 2.5 0.4
Total
Employment rate 55.3 78.1 65.9 5.8
26 countries
Unemployment rate 2.7 11.4 6.4 1.9
Tax wedge 11.9 56.0 40.6 9.6
EPL index 1.1 3.4 2.3 0.5
Note: Tax wedge and EPL index are significant at the level of 99%. Employment and unemployment 
rates are significant at the 95% significance level. 
Data for the EPL index for Cyprus and Malta are unavailable. Therefore there are 2 missing 
cases.
AT – Austria, BE – Belgium, BG – Bulgaria, CY – Cyprus, CZ – Czech Republic, DE – Germany, 
DK – Denmark, EE – Estonia, ES – Spain, FI – Finland, FR – France, GR – Greece, HR – Croatia, 
HU – Hungary, IE – Ireland, IT – Italy, LT – Lithuania, LU – Luxembourg, LV – Latvia, MT – Malta, 
NL – Netherlands, PL – Poland, PT – Portugal, RO – Romania, SE – Sweden, SI – Slovenia, 
SK – Slovakia, UK – United Kingdom.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
If instead of the tax wedge the personal average tax rate is taken into account, lower 
standard deviation appears among variables in their belonging cluster, but Croatia still re-
mains clustered among countries with a high tax burden and high labour market rigidity. 
Important to point out is that a relatively high tax burden is a huge incentive for firms 
to work in the informal sector of the economy. This may be partially confirmed if the 
existence and size of gap between the registered and the LFS (based on ILO methodolo-
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gy) unemployment rate is considered (see Appendix 3, Table A4). The average differen-
ce between the registered unemployment rate and the LFS unemployment rate for Croa-
tia in the period between 2001 and 2008 is 5.5% which is much higher than the average 
of every other CEE country. It means that a large number of workers in Croatia are of-
ficially considered as unemployed and working for their employers without being regi-
stered. This might also occur when total labour costs are high as it is in the Croatian case 
(Nestić, 1998). 
Previous results (Tables 3, 5 and 6) suggest that Croatia is clustered among countries 
with higher tax wedge (or higher personal average tax rate), higher employment protecti-
on legislation index, and higher unemployment rate (lower employment rate). But, such 
a wedge is not the total tax burden an average worker has to bear. According to Nickell 
(1997; 2004) the total tax rate (or total tax burden), measured as the sum of personal ave-
rage tax rate (i.e. income tax plus social security contributions paid by employees) and 
consumption tax rates, represents a crude measure of the tax wedge between real labour 
costs and real take-home pay. If that is taken into account, on average, a Croatian worker 
in 2008 monthly paid approximately 17.86% of net earnings in VAT (see Appendix 4). 
Then the total tax rate, as in Nickell (1997; 2004) and OECD (2009), would end up at the 
level of 48.35% (for the 100% average wage level) instead of 30.49%. 
If the total tax burden is considered, an average Danish worker bears the highest tax 
burden (65.9%), while an average Cypriot worker the lowest tax burden (20,05%) (Figu-
re 9). The overall picture provides some important conclusions: (1) the highest tax bur-
den from consumption is registered in Denmark (25.00%), Poland (21.18%) and Finland 
(20.40%); (2) countries with the lowest personal average tax rate register also a lowest 
consumption burden (mainly because these counties have some of the lowest standard 
VAT rates and one or more reduced rates); and (3) only in Ireland and Cyprus do average 
workers bear a high tax burden levied on consumption than that levied on labour23. Cro-
atia takes the 10th place according to the total tax burden, but it is important to notice that 
the burden from consumption in the country is higher than in Slovenia, the Netherlands 
or even Belgium, in which the average worker bears a higher total tax burden. 
Figure 9 refers to data in 2008, and explicitly for Croatia to a standard VAT rate of 
22%. In 2009, for the same reason that the “crisis tax” was introduced, this rate was ra-
ised by one percentage point, i.e. to 23%. This definitely resulted in one of the highest 
VAT standard rates as compared with EU member states24. If the new VAT rate is taken 
into account, then the consumption burden in Croatia will result in 18.63% (increase of 
0.77 percentage points), and the overall burden will be 48.46%. Giving that other coun-
tries also changed their VAT law (although most of them reduced the standard rate, intro-
duced new reduced rates or broadened the range of products for reduced rates; Latvia, Li-
thuania, Ireland and Hungary raised the standard VAT rate in 2009), Croatia would hold 
the same 10th position according to the total tax burden in 2009 also, but if the “crisis tax” 
23 It needs to be emphasised that consumption tax is represented only by VAT here. Introduction of other forms 
of consumption tax (mainly excises) would probably change the picture. However, that is out of the scope of this 
paper. VAT serves here only for illustrative purposes so we could show additional tax burden that an average work-
er carries.
24 Only Denmark and Sweden have a higher VAT rate set at 25%.
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is also taken into account it would move to the 9th position as compared with EU countri-





Figure 9:  Total tax burden for an average worker at 100% average wage level 
(% of gross wage) in 2008
*Data for 2007.




































































































































































5 Conclusion and policy implications
This paper examines the theoretical relations between taxes on labour and labour mar-
ket outcomes (employment and unemployment rates). The study shows that the reason for 
a high unemployment rate (or a low employment rate) can be found in the high tax wedge. 
Cluster analysis among EU countries plus Croatia showed that a high unemployment rate 
is evidenced in countries with a higher tax wedge, while a higher employment rate is re-
gistered in countries with a lower tax wedge. The same holds if instead of the tax wedge, 
the personal average tax rate is introduced. But this is not the general rule since there are 
countries in the EU that have a higher tax wedge (or tax rate) and a lower unemployment 
rate (higher employment rate). Therefore, a new variable (EPL index) is introduced into the 
analysis, in order to show that maybe some institutional characteristics are also responsible 
for the functioning of the labour market. In this case, Croatia belongs to a group of countries 
with higher tax burden, higher employment protection legislation index, and higher unem-
ployment rate (lower employment rate). So, how much does the tax bite really hurt? 
This paper demonstrates that in Croatia most of the labour tax burden is borne by em-
ployees, and not by employers. When the VAT rate is added to the tax wedge (personal 
average tax rate) the Croatian worker inclines even more towards the group of European 
workers with the highest total tax burdens. Consequently, because of the regressive ef-
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fect of consumption taxes, the welfare of workers with the lowest wage decreases more 
than the welfare of those with higher wages. Therefore, the depth of the tax bite (when 
the overall tax burden is considered) is greater for Croatian workers of lower economic 
power, and certainly hurts them more. The deepest tax bite in EU countries is present in 
old members, while workers in the new members (except for Hungary and Slovenia) are 
“bitten” less. Worthy of mention is that the average gross wage is much higher in old than 
new member states plus Croatia, so the subjective perception of the depth of the tax bite 
is definitely higher in the new member states.
Besides the already large tax bite and bad situation in the labour market, Croatian wor-
kers experienced additional “bites” in 2009. Namely, in order to alleviate the consequen-
ces of the financial crisis on decreasing budgetary revenues, Croatian government opted 
for two fiscal measures in 2009: (1) increment of the VAT standard rate by one percenta-
ge point (from 22% to 23%); (2) introduction of the already mentioned “crisis tax”, levi-
ed on the net wage and causing an additional burden for employees. These two measures 
may have improved budgetary revenues, but they have certainly worsened the welfare of 
an average worker in Croatia. 
Perhaps the measures taken (VAT tax rate increase and introduction of “crisis tax”) 
are not leading to an optimal solution. Maybe it would have been better if the VAT rate 
increment had been accompanied by an increase in the amount of personal allowance, 
which represents a “non-taxable” income category. Higher personal allowance is of more 
benefit to the welfare of lower-paid workers than, for example, a lower setting of inco-
me tax rates. That way a loss in personal income tax revenues (whose share in the total 
tax revenues in Croatia has constantly decreased since its introduction in 1994) would be 
compensated by an increase in VAT revenues, because a higher net wage would lead to 
higher consumption. Higher consumption would surely induce production and GDP in the 
end. The same effects, i.e. higher production and GDP, may be also obtained by lowering 
VAT on labour-intensive services in order to encourage entrepreneurship. 
Another option for the Croatian government may be the reduction of social security 
contributions, as they take the greatest share in the total tax burden. But, the expenditure 
side of the budget needs to be taken into account also. Lower revenue from social security 
contributions would surely, at least in the short run, result in cuts on the budget’s expen-
diture side. Since that the Croatian budget is “socially oriented”, because of the fact that 
great part of the expenditures are addressed to socially endangered groups, lower revenu-
es could even worsen the current situation. This is especially the case with contributions 
paid by employees and allocated for financing the pensions system, when one considers 
that the ratio of pensioners to insured worker was 1:1.5 in 2008 (HZMO, 2009). 
All this leads to the conclusion that Croatia could possibly increase its labour supply 
and enhance welfare by lowering its tax burden. However, due to the high component of 
socially-oriented expenditures in the Croatian government budget, for the time being this 
is not likely to happen. In the end, this analysis should be considered as preliminary and 
as an insufficient basis for risky policy experiments, especially in countries with such pre-
carious fiscal positions as Croatia. The safest way forward would clearly be to reduce ex-
penditures before cutting taxes.
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APPENDIX 1: Fundamentals of the personal income tax and social security 
contributions in Croatia in the period between 1994 and 2009
Table A1:  The fundamentals of the personal income tax in Croatia in the period 






















Jan, 1994 332 3*PA 25 3*PA - 35
Feb-Jun, 1994 400 3*PA 25 3*PA - 35
Jul-Dec, 1994 500 3*PA 25 3*PA - 35
1995-1996 700 3*PA 25 3*PA - 35
1997-1998 800 3*PA 20 3*PA - 35
1999 1,000 3*PA 20 3*PA - 35
Jan-Mar, 2000 1,000 3*PA 20 3*PA - 35
Apr-Dec, 2000 1,250 3*PA 20 3*PA - 35
2001-2002 1,250 2*PA 15 2*PA - 5*PA 25 5*PA - 35
2003-2004 1,500 2*PA 15 2*PA - 5*PA 25 5*PA - 14*PA 35 14*PA 45
2005-2007 1,600 2*PA 15 2*PA - 5*PA 25 5*PA - 14*PA 35 14*PA 45
Jan-Jun, 2008 1,600 2*PA 15 2*PA - 5*PA 25 5*PA - 14*PA 35 14*PA 45
Jul-Dec, 2008 1,800 2*PA 15 2*PA - 5*PA 25 5*PA - 14*PA 35 14*PA 45
2009 1,800 2*PA 15 2*PA - 5*PA 25 5*PA - 14*PA 35 14*PA 45
a Personal allowance (PA) on a monthly basis for every worker without children or any dependants. 
Higher personal allowances available for pensioners or persons domiciled in the areas of special nati-
onal concern are not considered here. 
Source: RIF (2009).
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Table A2:  Social security contributions in Croatia in the period between 1994 and 
2009 (in %)
Period













1995 12.75 7.00 1.90 1.90 2.20 - 23.85
Jan-Jul, 1996 12.75 7.00 1.90 1.90 2.20 - 23.85
Aug-Dec, 1996 12.75 7.00 0.85 0.85 2.20 - 22.80
1997 12.75 7.00 0.85 0.85 2.20 - 22.80
Jan, 1998 12.75 7.00 0.85 0.85 2.20 - 22.80
Feb-Jun, 1998 10.75 9.00 0.85 0.85 2.20 - 22.80
Jul-Dec, 1998 10.75 9.00 0.85 0.85 - - 20.60
1999-2002 10.75 9.00 0.85 0.85 - - 20.60
2003-2009 20.00 - - - - - 20.00
Period













1994 13.50 7.50 - - 0.80 0.80 22.60
1995 12.75 7.00 - - 0.76 0.76 21.27
Jan-Jul, 1996 12.75 7.00 - - 0.76 0.76 21.27
Aug-Dec, 1996 12.75 7.00 - 0.85 0.76 0.76 22.12
1997 12.75 7.00 - 0.85 0.76 0.76 22.12
Jan, 1998 12.75 7.00 - 0.85 0.76 0.76 22.12
Feb-Jun, 1998 10.75 9.00 - 0.85 0.76 0.76 22.12
Jul-Dec, 1998 10.75 9.00 - 0.85 - - 20.60
1999 10.75 9.00 - 0.85 - - 20.60
Jan-May, 2000 10.75 9.00 - 0.85 - - 20.60
Jun-Dec, 2000 8.75 7.00 - 0.85 - - 16.60
2001 8.75 7.00 - 0.85 - - 16.60
2002 8.75 7.00 0.47 0.85 - - 17.07
2003-2009 - 15.00 0.50 1.70 - - 17.20
Source: RIF (2009).
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APPENDIX 2: Data used in cluster analysis
Table A3:  Tax wedge, employment and unemployment rate, personal average tax rate 





tax rate EPL index
Austria 72.1 3.9 48.8 33.9 2.2
Belgium 62.4 7.0 56.0 42.5 2.5
Bulgariaa 64.0 5.7 36.5 21.1 2.0c
Cyprusa 70.9 3.8 13.9 8.5 n.a.
Czech Republic 66.6 4.4 42.9 23.6 2.0
Germany 70.7 7.6 52.0 42.7 2.4
Denmark 78.1 3.4 41.2 40.9 1.8
Estoniaa 70.7 5.6 38.7 20.2 2.3
Spain 64.3 11.4 37.8 19.0 3.0
Finland 71.1 6.4 43.5 30.0 2.0
France 64.9 7.4 49.3 27.8 2.9
Greece 61.9 7.8 42.4 26.3 2.8
Hungary 63.4 7.9 54.1 38.3 1.9
Ireland 67.6 6.1 22.9 14.6 1.3
Italy 58.7 6.8 46.5 29.3 2.4
Lithuaniaa 68.6 5.9 43.0 25.3 2.8c
Luxembourg 64.3 5.1 35.9 27.2 3.4
Latviaa 70.9 7.7 42.4 28.5 2.5c
Maltaa 56.7 6.1 23.6 17.8 n.a.
Netherlands 55.3 2.7 44.9 36.1 2.1
Poland 59.2 7.2 39.7 28.6 2.2
Portugal 68.2 8.1 37.6 22.8 2.9
Romaniaa 59.0 6.1 43.3 27.8 2.8c
Sweden 74.3 6.3 44.6 26.7 2.2
Sloveniab 68.6 4.5 44.0 34.3 2.6
Slovakia 62.3 9.5 38.9 22.8 1.8
United Kingdom 71.5 5.7 32.8 25.6 1.1
Croatia 57.8 8.6 40.7 30.5 2.7c
a Data for 2007 (for tax wedge and personal average tax rate).
b Data for 2006 (for tax wedge and personal average tax rate).
c Data for 2003.
Source: Eurostat (2009); OECD (2009, 2010); Tonin (2005); Nešporová and Cazes (2006); Romih 
and Festić (2008); Eamets and Masso (2004); Authors’ calculation.
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APPENDIX 4: Consumption tax burden calculations
The intuition is to distribute the net wage among consumption products and services 
according to their share in total individual consumption (retrieved from Individual Con-
sumption Survey results)25. This includes the following steps:
(1) Individual Consumption Survey results are retrieved from the Eurostat Official 
Web Site for EU member states and from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics for Croatia. 
This survey shows average shares in consumption for each country, according to which 
the net wage of an average worker at 100% wage level is distributed. 
(2) Appropriate VAT rates for each country and each COICP26 category are identifi-
ed. Data of VAT rates for each EU member states are retrieved from the European Com-
mission (2008 and 2009, for respective years) and for Croatia from the VAT Official Le-
gislation. The appropriate rates are applied to suitable COICP categories and by summing 
up the paid VAT per category the total amount of VAT paid is obtained.
(3) The share of the obtained total VAT amount in the net wage is calculated. This 
share is the consumption tax burden an average worker actually bears. 
Limitations of this methodology:
(a) Excise duties are not taken into account; therefore the consumption burden sho-
uld be taken as an approximate measure.
(b) Reduced, super-reduced or zero rates are usually applied to a narrow set of goods 
or services. Therefore in some cases these “non-standard” rates are applied to the whole 
amount of net wage spent on a particular COICP category (i.e. on a broader range of 
goods and services), not just on the exact narrow set of goods and services on which they 
should have been (realistically) applied. 
25 Liabilities for debt or for savings are not taken into account and therefore the whole net wage is considered 
for consumption.
26 COICP is meant for Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose. It consists of 12 main categories 
of products and services. 
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